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Abstract: 
How can episodes of crisis, breakdown, violence and collapse be explained in the 
social sciences? This paper addresses this broad question by studying an 
extraordinary episode of mass tension and anxiety in post-war Sri Lanka caused by a 
mystery male predator known as the ‘grease devil’.  Reports over widespread 
attacks on women by this shadowy, ubiquitous, and powerful being led to 
heightened levels of vigilance and fear across large parts of rural and peri-urban Sri 
Lanka in mid-2011.  It had a particularly strong impact on the formerly war-torn 
north-east of the island where it led to violent confrontations between affected 
communities and the police and military, who were widely held to be complicit. This 
paper attempts to reconstruct and understand the grease devil crisis by drawing on 
primary materials, including fieldwork, and by engaging with a range of concepts 
and analytical vehicles across the historical and social science literature including 
the sociology of moral panics, the anthropology of magic, Sri Lankan demonology, 
and hegemonic control. In doing so, it identifies three different ways to understand 
the crisis: (i) causal; (ii) instrumental/functional and; (iii) event as metaphor; and 
engages in a critical evaluation of the extent to which each of these relate to the 
available evidence to produce analytically relevant insights. 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am grateful to the Department of International Development and STICERD at the London School of 
Economics for support that made this research possible, and to Verite Research for research 
assistance.  I am grateful for thoughtful engagement, insight, and feedback at various stages from 
Jonathan Spencer, Jayadeva Uyangoda, Jonathan Goodhand, Dave Rampton, Nishan De Mel, and 
four anonymous reviewers at the JAS. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at seminars and 
workshops at LSE, Oxford, and Yale. I am very grateful to the organisers of those events for inviting 
me, and to the participants and respondents for their feedback.  
Venugopal	  -­‐	  Violence	  and	  Moral	  Panic	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  
	  
1	  
	  
 
1. Introduction: 
‘They have some special powers, like springs on their shoes, to make them jump 
high and climb into houses from the upstairs’.  He went on, dropping his voice 
down to a conspiratorial whisper, ‘I have heard that it is the Chinese that are behind 
it.  The president is dying and he doesn’t trust the Western doctors. So he has gone 
to the Chinese.  Their doctors are asking for a special medicine made from the 
blood of virgins and they got a special military group trained to get this.  That is 
why they only scratch the women, and don’t rape.  They want to get the blood from 
them and take it back.’ 
 
Later that night, on 25 August 2011, the same man telephoned me to say that there 
was an attack going on right then by the ‘grease man’ in his own neighbourhood 
near the railway station in Batticaloa, a town in eastern Sri Lanka.  Shortly after 
10pm a police van had been seen driving past slowly, and had stopped to let 
someone out.  Suddenly, there was a power cut and a few minutes later, the whole 
neighbourhood awoke to the sound of a woman screaming in terror.  It was from a 
house two down from his own, occupied by three women.  After the power cut, one 
of the women saw the silhouette of a man outside her first floor bedroom window, 
and heard him rattling the bars.   
 
In response to the alarm, neighbours rushed to the house to find out what 
happened, but were too late to catch the culprit.  An impromptu posse of young 
men armed with flashlights, sticks and cricket bats assembled to patrol the area and 
hunt out the assailant.  In the course of the telephone conversation where this was 
being narrated to me, about an hour after the incident, the police arrived, and 
ordered the neighbourhood vigilantes to go home. 
 
The anecdote recounted above from fieldwork in Batticaloa occurred during an 
extraordinary episode of mass tension and anxiety in Sri Lanka over attacks on 
women by a mystery male predator known as the ‘grease devil’.  Reports over 
widespread attacks on women by this shadowy, ubiquitous, powerful, and vaguely 
supernatural being led to heightened levels of vigilance and fear across rural and 
peri-urban Sri Lanka for several months in the third quarter of 2011.  The impact of 
the grease devil anxiety was felt particularly acutely in areas occupied by Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic minorities – the central provinces and the formerly war-torn north-east, where 
it reached crisis proportions for the period of about five weeks from 8 August – 10 
September 2011.   
 
During this crisis period, there were hundreds of daily sightings and attacks 
reported and a palpable sense of fear, tension, and anger. It led to violent 
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confrontations between affected communities and the police and military, who were 
widely held to be both unresponsive and complicit.  The onset of the grease devil 
crisis in the north-east must also been seen in the context of the recent end to the 
30 year long civil war, the festering and unresolved ethnic conflict, the continuing 
deep alienation of the Tamil population from the Sri Lankan state and the ruling 
government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and the long-standing day-to-day 
tensions in the north-east between the overwhelmingly Sinhalese military forces and 
the Tamil-speaking civilian population. 
 
This paper attempts a two-fold task of reconstructing and describing the sequence 
of events as they unfolded during the crisis period, and evaluating how they can be 
analysed, interpreted and understood, examining in turn three possible options and 
their consequences.  It draws upon fieldwork conducted serendipitously in 
Batticaloa, Sri Lanka during the grease devil crisis in August 2011, and also on 
previous (December 2010), and subsequent (August 2012) periods.  In addition, it 
also draws extensively upon English, Tamil and Sinhala newspaper coverage of the 
incidents.   
 
In interpreting the crisis, this paper engages with three nested questions and 
discusses their consequences: (i) what happened? (ii) who was responsible? (iii) what 
does it reveal?  The first question relates to the very simple and simplistic quest for 
the ‘truth’, and explores the available primary evidence on whether the grease devil 
crisis was real or imagined.  The second question explores the possible 
instrumentalities and the way that different actors attached a variety of different 
rationalisations to these events.  The third explores the grease devil as a metaphor, 
and raises three different ways in which this episode could be said to have revealed 
some deeper condition: (i) unhealed trauma relived; (ii) structural violence enacted; 
(iii) hegemony undone.  In doing so, it draws upon and engages with a variety of 
different strands of literature across anthropology, sociology, social history, 
comparative religion, psychology, and political science that investigate mass 
hysteria, witchcraft, magic, rumours, demonology, and ethnic conflict. 
 
 
2. Crisis:  
The grease devil, variously referred to also as grease man, grease yakka, grease 
monster, grease demon, grease boothaya, grease peyi, or grease bootham, is a 
shadowy and ambiguous figure who inhabits the cosmos of rural and small town Sri 
Lanka.  Much has been written about demons, spirits and malign, powerful, 
paranormal beings in the Sinhalese village, but the grease devil appears to an 
innovation of uncertain provenance.  There is no mention of the grease devil in any 
of the studies and compendia of Sinhalese demonology during the 19th or 20th 
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centuries and the very use of an English word ‘grease’ as prefix suggests that it 
does not belong to pre-colonial period.  There is also much uncertainty and 
confusion about the exact nature of the grease devil’s powers and its relationship to 
the more familiar demons who animate the historical and ethnographic literature, 
such as the terrible Maha Sona (De Silva 1865, Barnett 1916, Wirz 1954, Yalman 
1964, Obeyesekere 1970, Kapferer 1991, Scott 1994).   
 
While there is widespread recognition and belief in the grease devil as was evident 
from the events described below, there is also widespread disbelief and cynicism 
about its magical nature.  This disbelief is strongest in urban middle class Sri Lanka, 
where, (as the work of Gananath Obeyesekere, Richard Gombrich, Martin 
Southwold, Michael Ames have described), the ‘little tradition’ of magical animism, 
folk religion, and village demons have long been viewed with suspicion and disdain.  
 
But widespread disbelief in the grease devil prevails even in the rural and small 
town milieu where belief in it is the highest. In that context, the grease devil is 
widely known as the identity and disguise adopted by burglars who pre-emptively 
smear their bodies with grease in order to escape capture. The figure of the grease 
devil is also associated with the antics of adolescent males after dark, either in trying 
to frighten people, or more frequently, as an opportunistic disguise adopted by 
voyeurs, while prying into women’s homes as ‘peeping toms’.1  
 
In other words, the grease devil is upon closer inspection, a figure of some 
ambiguity: it is held to be deeply rooted in tradition, but upon closer inspection is 
of recent origin. There is widespread belief in its magical and demonic powers, but 
also equally widespread disbelief.  The ambiguity and fluid co-existence of a diverse 
range of understandings of the grease devil play an important role in understanding 
and attaching meaning to the events that followed. 
 
The grease devil crisis arose in mid-2011, in the context of a series of unsolved 
murders that happened in the largely Sinhalese town of Kahawatte in the central 
district of Ratnapura.  Seven elderly women had been found murdered over the 
time-span of a few months in that town, and the increasingly hyperbolic newspaper, 
television and radio coverage of those crimes radiated fear and tension well beyond 
the local villages and into the national arena.   
 
In July 2011, the police finally announced the arrest of two suspects.  Paradoxically, 
the news of those arrests served not to diminish tensions, but rather to escalate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Jayadeva	  Uyangoda	  for	  his	  insights	  on	  this	  issue.	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them.  The recapitulation and re-playing of the news and circumstances of the 
crimes served to broaden the national consciousness of the macabre nature of the 
murders, leading to a wave of anxiety about the safety of women.  These fears 
appear to have become connected and fused at some point with the pre-existing 
figure of the grease devil, so that rumours circulating in the countryside increasingly 
identified the problem as something more terrifying than just a serial killer, but as 
part of a larger, more demonically connected project of violence and bloodshed.  
 
Partly in response to these growing fears of grease devils, the police announced the 
arrest of seven youths from the Kandy area on 2 August.  The news report goes to 
explain: ‘Police said these youths known as “Grease devils”, peeped into homes 
while roaming the streets at nights after consuming liquor’.  Once again, rather than 
quelling fears, the news of these arrests only confirmed the widespread concerns 
that there was some deeper, more organised enterprise at work, and that other 
such grease devils could still be at large and waiting to strike.   
 
By 5 August, the level of public disquiet required the police to call a press 
conference to announce that the grease devil was a myth and that it had created an 
unwarranted public hysteria.  Somewhat contradictorily, the same police spokesman 
also announced that all grease devils had been arrested, so that they no more 
roamed the countryside (VK 5.8.11 and DN 5.8.11).   
 
Rumours and reports of the grease devil grew rapidly throughout Sri Lanka in the 
weeks of July and August 2011, but they gained much greater traction and 
prominence in the Tamil language media, and had far more impact in the 
predominantly Tamil-speaking parts of the island.  This meant, among other things, 
that the grease devil crisis was at its most acute in areas that had been affected by 
the recently concluded civil war.   
 
Sri Lanka’s civil war of 1983-2009 between separatist Tamil insurgents and state 
security forces was fought largely in the terrain of the Tamil-speaking north-east and 
was embedded in a longer political history of ethnic conflict.  In broad terms, the 
ethnic conflict took shape in the late-colonial and early post-colonial periods around 
the rival claims of the Sinhala majority (75 percent of the island-wide population as 
of the 2011 census), and the north-east Tamil minority (11 percent).  Two other 
Tamil-speaking ethnic minorities, the Muslims (9 percent) and the upcountry or 
‘Indian’ Tamils (5 percent) were affected indirectly by the conflict to varying 
degrees. 
 
In the last phase of the war between 2006-2009, the Sri Lankan military steadily 
encircled and advanced into the territory held by the separatist insurgents, the 
Venugopal	  -­‐	  Violence	  and	  Moral	  Panic	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  
	  
5	  
	  
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), first in the east, and later in the north.  
Government forces eventually won a crushing victory in May 2009 in which the 
entire leadership of the LTTE was killed, while virtually all the surviving cadres, 
numbering over 10,000 had surrendered.  In the meanwhile, an indeterminate 
number of Tamil civilians, widely assumed to be in the tens of thousands, who were 
trapped and sandbagged between the two sides in the final confrontation were also 
killed. 
 
The end of the civil war had not however, ended the larger political problems of the 
ethnic conflict and majority-minority relations within which it arose.  On the contrary, 
the minorities, and particularly the north-east Tamils remained deeply alienated 
from the Sri Lankan state, and viewed the government of President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa with particular suspicion and hostility. (ICG 2012, Goodhand 2010, 
Walton 2011) 
 
 
Chart 1: Intensity of Media Reports on Grease Devil Activity by Region.  Source: 
underlying data for this chart was collated from the frequency of grease devil 
incidents reported in Virakesari, Lakbima, Divaina, Lankadiva, Daily Mirror, Sunday 
Leader, Sunday Times, and Tamilnet.   
 
 
As chart 1 demonstrates, news reports of grease devil incidents tended to be 
clustered spatially, and travelled from the up-country tea estates of central Sri Lanka 
on 8 August, to the Muslim parts of the east coast on 10 August, the Tamil towns 
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and villages of Batticaloa, Mannar and Mullativu on 15 August, and finally, the 
overwhelmingly Tamil villages of the Jaffna peninsula on 21 August.   
 
The crisis per se began on 8 August, when Tamil language news media first gave 
prominent coverage to a series of attacks on women in the Central province. That 
day, a ‘mysterious man’ attacked 30 year old Devika Joseph at her home in Badulla, 
after which she was admitted to hospital with nail marks and scratches all over her 
body.  A female plantation worker in Nuwara Eliya was threatened by a man with a 
knife, and a 28 year old woman in Gampola was admitted to hospital after being 
strangled by a man while on her way to the toilet.  News of grease devil incidents 
involving sightings, attacks, scratches and stolen jewellery were so widespread that 
day across Nuwara Eliya and Badulla districts that it provoked an impromptu 
demonstration in Badulla town by women demanding that it be brought to an end 
(VK 09.08.11 & 10.08.11). 
 
Two days later in Vazhachenai on the east coast, Ushanar Marzuka, a 31 year old 
Muslim woman, was confronted outside her home at 11am by two men with their 
faces painted black. She recounted to the newspaper that ‘They asked me where I 
was heading. As I responded one man tried to grab me by my hand. I freed myself 
and pushed him back. In the process one of them scratched me with a sharp 
object’. Hearing her cries, more than a hundred local residents gathered to search 
for the assailant, and subsequently found a man who, after a thorough beating, was 
handed to the police.  The police arrested the suspect, but to the immense anger of 
the local community, released him shortly afterwards.  This led to a heated 
confrontation and a violent clash between the villagers and the police, resulting in 
two policemen and two civilians being admitted to hospital with injuries (ST 14.8.11, 
VK 11.8.11). 
 
On the same day, 150 kilometres down the east coast in Pottuvil, another Muslim 
woman, Aashika aged 22 was attacked by a stranger at 8.30pm outside her house.  
When she managed to struggle free and raise the alarm, her family arrived to find a 
man running away dressed in black, although Aashika suspected that there may 
have been two men (SL 21.08.11).  
 
Grease devil sightings intensified in the next few days.  There was an atmosphere of 
thick tension and fear in many towns and villages: outsiders were viewed with 
suspicion and liable to be attacked; women frequently stayed at home, under male 
guard, particularly after dark.  Attendance at evening prayers in mosques thinned 
out significantly, a matter that was viewed with particular regret given that this was 
the holy month of Ramadan.  The tea estates of the Central province became 
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economically and administratively paralysed for days as men and women refused to 
leave home for work and kept their children from school. 
 
The panic, stampedes, and angry chases generated by the grease devil scare 
caused a number of accidents, including deaths.  On 10 August, a young man 
chasing a suspected grease devil in Gampola was killed when he fell into an animal 
trap (VK 12.8.11). On 16 August, a 42 year old woman was struck dead by the 
Batticaloa-Colombo train while attempting to run to safety after hearing that there 
was a grease devil in the area (VK 17.8.11). 
 
A frightened and desperate populace demanded that the administration and 
political leaders respond firmly and bring an end to the attacks, but to no avail.  
Police spokesmen held meetings and made numerous announcements at the local 
and national level that the grease devil was a figment of the public imagination and 
that people should not take the law into their own hands.  As before, the attempts 
by the police to defuse public concerns and dismiss the problem perversely served 
to aggravate and fuel anxiety. It provided evidence either of official apathy or 
complicity.  There was a collapse in public confidence in the security forces, and the 
emergence of a growing number of community vigilante groups who assembled to 
keep watch and give chase.  Those suspected or identified as grease devils were 
often violently attacked, and sometimes handed over to the police. 
 
In an early incident that brought the crisis into the spotlight of the national media, 
two suspected grease devils were killed in an upcountry estate on 11 August.  News 
reports describe that a group of six unidentified men who entered the Dambetenna 
tea estate in Haputale (Badulla), were attacked by a large group of estate workers, 
said to number 28 people.  Four men managed to escape, but two were killed.  
Following this, there was such ‘great unrest’ in the area, that even the relatives of 
the two dead men were attacked with stones when they came to claim their corpses 
from the hospital (VK 12.8.11, DM 12.8.11, ST 14.8.11). 
 
In the next few days, from 11-17 August, there was an explosive increase in grease 
devil activity in the East, as well as numerous violent confrontations with the security 
forces.  Unlike the tea estates of the Central province, which are largely populated 
by Tamils of Indian extraction, who were only indirectly affected by the ethnic 
conflict, the East had been directly, and deeply affected by the decades of civil war. 
Amidst a complex three-sided communal confrontation overlaid by the violence of 
insurgent and counter-insurgent forces, the population of the East suffered 
extended periods of grave physical insecurity, enduring constant displacement, and 
thousands of unresolved disappearances. In mid-2011, more than two years after 
the end of the war, life in the East continued to be dominated by a highly militarized 
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administration and a large, predominantly Sinhalese military presence amidst a 
Tamil and Muslim civilian population (Korf 2012, McGilvray 1997, 2008, Lawrence 
2000, Whitaker 1997, Walker 2013).   
 
When the grease devil crisis unfolded in the east, its effects were magnified on the 
one hand by the long history of civil-military tensions in the area, but also by its 
timing during Ramadan, which led many in the large Muslim population in the east 
to believe that this was a deliberate religious affront and provocation. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that although the focus of this narrative is on 
grease devil attacks in ethnic minority-dominated areas, grease devil anxiety and 
incidents were reported around the island, and many elements of the phenomenon 
and its consequences were very similar across regions and ethnicities.  The big 
difference however is that the grease devil provoked widespread acts of ‘public 
disorder’, and confrontations with the security forces only among the minorities.  It 
created a rippling crisis of governability in those areas, and particularly in the heavily 
militarised north and east, many parts of which had only recently returned to 
government control. 
 
On 11 August, there appeared to have been an overnight invasion of grease devils 
into the south-eastern district of Ampara, with a huge surge of attacks and sightings 
in the mostly Muslim towns and villages of Sammanthurai, Karaitivu, Akkaraipattu, 
Kalmunai, Maruthamunai, and Pottuvil (VK 13.8.11). In a number of cases, local 
villagers who had captured suspected grease devils and handed them over to the 
police were incensed to learn that these men were subsequently released without 
charge.  In many other cases, those identified as grease devils had, upon pursuit run 
into police stations, military camps, or Buddhist temples, confirming widely held 
suspicions that the state security forces were in fact, behind the attacks and that the 
grease devils were none other than soldiers in disguise. 
 
Over the next two days, anger at the grease devils led to furious demonstrations 
and attacks against the security forces by angry mobs across Ampara district.  In 
Sammanthurai, two policemen were set upon and chased into the police station by 
a large group of villagers.  In Pottuvil three wildlife officers conducting an elephant 
census were attacked, and in nearby Urady, several army officers were assaulted by 
a group of villagers. In the sequence of events and the escalation that ensued 
between the army and a deeply agitated local population in the Pottuvil area, an 
army officer shot dead a man who turned out to be a local politician of the Muslim 
Congress party (VK 12.8.11 & 13.8.11, ST 14.8.11, SL 21.8.11). 
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Two days later on 14 August, in the town of Kinniya further north in Trincomalee 
district, another serious and violent confrontation occurred outside the navy base, 
into which a suspected grease devil had run.  When the navy refused to hand the 
suspect over to the group chasing him, it triggered public disturbances that lasted 
over two days.  A large and highly charged crowd of demonstrators assembled, 
burning down a military check-point, and encircling and hurling stones at the base.  
The situation was ultimately defused and the crowd dispersed only after 24 men 
were arrested following the arrival of paramilitary troops from the Special Task 
Force (STF), and with the deployment of armed helicopters from the base.  But the 
disturbances carried on to the next day when another group of demonstrators 
surrounded the local Divisional Secretariat office, and prevented the military 
commander of the Eastern Province, Major General Boniface Perera, and the 
Trincomalee Government Agent Major General V.R.D. Silva from leaving the 
building for several hours.  It eventually required the arrival in person of the three 
most powerful Muslim ministers from Colombo, Rauff Hakeem, A.H.M. Fowzie, and 
Rishard Bathiudeen to negotiate a peaceful end to the standoff (DM 16.8.11, VK 
16.8.11). 
 
As the crisis rolled on to its second week, the focus of media attention and reports 
of grease devil incidents shifted towards newer areas of Batticaloa, Mullaitivu, and 
Mannar. In contrast to the upcountry Tamils of the Central province and the Muslims 
of Ampara and Kinniya, these newer areas have a predominance of north-eastern 
Tamils, the ethnic group most directly and deeply affected by the war and its 
aftermath.  On 16 August, residents of Puthoor in Batticaloa gave chase to a 
‘mysterious man’ who ran into Sethukuda police station, prompting a demonstration 
demanding the removal of that police station (VK 17.8.11). The next day in nearby 
Urani, a grease devil who had escaped after assaulting a young woman was seen 
entering a nearby police post, triggering angry demonstrations by local residents 
who burnt tyres and shut down the main Trincomalee-Batticaloa artery road (VK 
18.8.11, TN 17.8.11). Batticaloa remained in the grip of tension and deep fear with 
a string of incidents including an attack on a girl in Chenkaladi by a man later 
discovered to be an army sergeant (VK 22.8.11), and the discovery of men lurking in 
the womens’ toilets and the roof of the Nurses Training Institute, that forced the 
institute to send all 180 of its terrified students back home (VK 20.8.11, TN 21.8.11).  
In Thandiyadi village, an area in the hinterland formerly under LTTE control, two 
policemen who were suspected to be grease devils were assaulted by a large group 
of men, following which ‘police retaliatory action’ resulted in 18 persons being 
admitted to Batticaloa Hospital (ST 21.8.11). 
 
In its third and fourth weeks, the grease devil crisis moved to Jaffna, where a 
predictable pattern of events unfolded yet again.  There were multiple sightings of 
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the grease devil, several attacks on women, vigilante groups of local residents who 
chased and attacked suspects, the escape of such suspects into police stations or 
army camps, aggressive confrontations between residents and security forces, 
followed ultimately by arrests, and even violent reprisals by the security forces 
against those communities.   
 
By the second week of September, the grease devil issue had died down, almost as 
suddenly as it started.  There is no ready explanation at hand for why or how it 
finally came to an end except perhaps that it had exhausted itself after having 
covered virtually the entire geography of the Tamil and Muslim-dominated parts of 
Sri Lanka.  In each locality, (see chart 1), grease devil sightings followed a familiar 
pattern and life-cycle, starting suddenly and intensifying quickly to its peak in the 
first 2-3 days, and then subsiding gradually over the next 10 days.  
 
While there were far fewer sightings and vigilante attacks once this cycle came to an 
end, the memory of the terror endured in that relatively short span of time was 
vividly felt and recalled many months later.  In interviews conducted a year after the 
episode in August 2012 in Batticaloa, Kattankudy, and Eravur, Tamil and Muslim 
respondents uniformly described the fear and paralysis caused by the grease devil 
as worse than what they had to endure during the decades of civil war. 
 
What sense can be made of the grease devil crisis?  The events that transpired and 
the rich body of evidence available to reconstruct and analyse it makes it possible 
to bring a variety of different epistemological approaches and analytical vehicles to 
bear.  At the same time, the very idiosyncratic, contingent, and counter-intuitive 
nature of the events makes it challenging to take any one of these different 
approaches forward very far in identifing causality or explaining its specific form and 
timing.   
 
 
3. Were the Grease Devils Real or Just Rumours? 
A rudimentary way to understand the grease devil crisis would be to evaluate the 
available evidence to unravel and explain what happened.  Did these bizarre attacks 
actually take place in the manner claimed, and if so, who or what was responsible?  
Or were they instead the product of a febrile collective imagination?  In a narrative 
that frequently evoked the stereotypical confrontation in South Asia between the 
rational modern state and an irrational pre-modern society, the Sri Lankan 
government and security forces insisted that the grease devil did not exist, and that 
it was the product of an unfounded and irrational fear psychosis.  Defence Secretary 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa spoke out on several occasions, dismissing the issue as ‘a 
myth’, and ‘just rumours’ (TN 24.8.11, VK 25.8.11, DN 25.8.11). Numerous police 
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spokesmen at the national and local levels appeared frequently in the media and in 
community meetings to deny the existence of any grease devils (VK 20.8. 11).  The 
military commander of Jaffna, Major General Mahinda Hathurusinghe explained that 
‘The grease devils and mysterious men are just imaginary tales’. Another senior 
army commander asserted: ‘There is absolutely no evidence to support the 
grease yaka theory. It has been created out of thin air by an atmosphere of fear’ (SL 
21.8.11). 
 
Indeed, all the suspected grease devils caught, arrested, or lynched turned out on 
further investigation to be innocent luckless passers-by.  For example, it later 
emerged from media and police investigations that the two men killed by estate 
workers in Haputale on 11 August, were travelling salesmen from a nearby village 
(VK 12.8.11, DM 12.8.11, ST 14.8.11). In a Sinhalese village of Ambagamuwa near 
Hatton, two strangers assaulted by local villagers were later discovered to be Indian 
engineers working in a nearby hospital project (TN 25.8.11). 
 
Similarly, when, the Batticaloa Regional Office of the Human Rights Commission of 
Sri Lanka (HRCSL) visited the nine persons remanded in custody as grease devils as 
of 16 August, they determined that that three were mentally disturbed, one was a 
beggar, and two were door-to-door Sinhalese trinket sellers.  Two others were 
unavailable for interview as they were in hospital recovering from serious injuries 
received at the hands of community vigilantes.  The last one turned out to be a 
young Muslim man from another town who had alighted the bus and was waiting by 
side of a school for a rendezvous with his ‘lover’.  When she failed to appear, he 
approached a passing woman to ask for information, who, mistaking him for a 
grease devil, ran away and shouted for help.  Local residents and passers-by 
promptly rushed to her assistance and assaulted him before handing him over to 
the police (interview, 29 August 2011, SO 14 August 2011, DM 13.8.11).  
 
There is a significant and sophisticated body of literature on similar sounding 
episodes that has conceptualised the role of rumours (Das 1998, Spencer 2000), 
many of which also involve violent bio-medical intrusion, including the theft of 
bodily fluids (White 2000) the theft of body parts (Scheper-Hughes 1996), or the 
forcible sterilization of women (Bass 2008).  The sociological literature on ‘moral 
panic’ (Cohen 1973, Goode and Nachman 1994) also provides a way to understand 
this episode, and describes how the media plays a central role in the construction of 
‘folk devils’. Indeed, there is much to be said of the role of the vernacular language 
media in the creation and dissemination of the grease devil fear, and also in 
accounting for its rippling patterns of transmission across the country.  The 
comparative literature from psychology and the anthropology of spirit possession 
and mass hysteria also provide plausible accounts of the contagion and transmission 
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mechanisms that were manifest.  More importantly, they suggest that those in the 
grip of extreme anxiety can be deeply convinced that they have endured a 
paranormal encounter, and can exhibit the emotional and even physical symptoms 
that resulted from it.  All of these remain plausible explanations that fit some 
elements of the evidence available, but their role is perhaps more significant in 
lending this phenomenon a conceptual vocabulary and comparative insights, rather 
than an explanation and a satisfying analytical end-point as such. 
 
In contrast, the weight of evidence from numerous victims would suggest that the 
grease devil was indeed real.  There was a recognizable pattern of attacks on 
women across the country in this period, who described assailants with similar types 
of attire and behaviour.  Many victims were hospitalized with characteristic scratches 
and cuts.  They explained the details of their encounters in person, and in detail to 
journalists, police, and hospital staff, with images of scratched bodies displayed 
widely on television, print and electronic media.   
 
Indeed, any explanation of the grease devils must take into account the sheer 
number and diversity of similar incidents that were reported.  Even if the large 
majority of the encounters were imagined, invented, or the result of mistaken 
identity, it would seem improbable that hundreds of different, unconnected people 
in different parts of the country had, in a synchronized manner, enacted the same 
hoax, or had imagined the same kinds of attacks from the same kind of assailant.  
 
In sum, any quest for the definitive truth about the grease devils that draws on the 
primary evidence available to establish its causation is quickly frustrated by the 
inconclusive or contradictory testimony of the witnesses and those accused of 
involvement.  Perhaps the only such finding that can be established on this basis 
and about which there is no dispute is that there was indeed a crisis, and that 
people did genuinely feel terrified and vulnerable; that numerous women reported 
being attacked, and were hospitalised with evident injuries.  In other words, what is 
verifiable and can be explained without ambiguity or contradiction is often trivial, 
itself in need of explanation, or is at best only a fragment of a larger chain of 
explanation.   
 
In order to go beyond this, it becomes necessary to examine not just what meagre 
facts can be established, but what rationale might exist and what meaning it might 
contain.  In other words, what plausible explanations can be attached to these 
reports that might provide a cause or culprit for this apparently inexplicable episode 
of social breakdown?  Or else, can these rudimentary findings be extended and 
made more meaningful by placing them within a larger context, in order to view 
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them not as an isolated case of mass hysteria, but as symptomatic of some broader 
condition, or as a lens with which to view the world at large? 
 
 
4. Who did it and why? 
In the absence of any self-evident answers to the mystery of the grease devil, can an 
understanding of the hidden functionality or instrumentality of the crisis shed any 
light?  Is it possible to identify a political, economic, social, or even sexual rationale 
to the grease devil attacks that can help explain them?  The search for a deeper 
logic within illogic, functionality to dysfunction, and rationale for the irrational is a 
well established tradition in the critical social sciences. It has particular bearing in 
the study of violence and developing societies, not just because irrationality and 
dysfunction are the norm there, but because this juxtaposition is embedded in the 
confrontation between the elements under study (the state versus society), and is 
also embodied in the relationship between the academic and objects of academic 
research.   
 
David Keen’s analysis of famine and civil war, for example, searches for political and 
economic agendas that profit and thrive in that environment, and whose interests it 
serves to perpetuate (Keen 1997).  Chabal and Daloz’s monograph on African 
politics describes ‘disorder as politically instrument’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999).  Paul 
Brass suggests a similar elite instrumentality at play in his work on communal 
violence in India (Brass 2003). There is also a rich tradition within the historical and 
anthropological literature that seeks (and rarely fails to find) hidden instrumentality 
behind witchcraft accusations (De Certau 2000), and that has successfully uncovered 
the presence of wrath, greed, sloth, pride, lust, envy, or gluttony among the 
accusers. 
 
In the case of the grease devil crisis however, any academic exercise aimed at 
identifying instrumentality, or some rationale quickly confronts the reality that the 
field of study is itself replete with numerous competing rationalisations of the crisis.  
It was almost impossible to engage in conversation in Batticaloa (or elsewhere in Sri 
Lanka) in that period without reference to the grease devil, its likely culprits, and 
their hidden motives, which ranged from the complex and bio-political, to the trivial 
and parochial.  While the ghostliness of the grease devil remained present 
throughout the crisis and lent it a terrifying supernatural edge, most people were 
upon reflection, quick to dismiss that element and reached instead for very 
grounded, this-worldly explanations.  Moreover, these explanations were often 
strongly polarised and clustered different actors on the basis of their ethnicity, and 
their relationship to the state. 
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1. Tamils and Muslims.  Tamils and Muslim of the northeast were overwhelmingly of 
the opinion that the grease devil attacks were organised by the government, and 
that they were military men in disguise.  As the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
member of parliament for Batticaloa, S. Yogeswaran said (VK, 25.8.11) ‘It is obvious 
that there is government involvement in the grease man phenomenon. If not why 
has the government, which has control, done nothing about it?’ Speaking in 
parliament, MP for Jaffna, S. Sridharan, charged that ‘The people of the North have 
more than enough proof that the military is involved in the mysterious men issue’ 
(VK, 24.08.2011).  The TNA General Secretary Mavai Senathirajah similarly charged 
that ‘It is clear that the military and grease men are interlinked. Therefore the 
President can control this if he so wishes (VK, 03.09.2011).  
 
It was frequently remarked that the attacks happened only in areas occupied by 
non-Sinhalese ethnic minorities, in the proximity of military camps, and that 
suspects often ran into police stations or military camps when identified. A Muslim 
interviewee noted that ‘there were no incidents in Ariyampathy because there is no 
army camp there, so nowhere to escape’. A Tamil NGO worker remarked (in a 
conversation otherwise unrelated to the grease devils) that ‘the Muslims managed 
to get it stopped in their areas when their ministers talked to the president’. One 
anecdote that was widely recounted during the crisis was that a policeman was seen 
saluting a grease devil when asked to arrest him, the implication being that the 
grease devil was a superior officer in the security forces.   
 
In terms of rationale, Tamils in particular tended to view the grease devils as part of 
the long history of military surveillance, harassment, and violent subjugation, 
stretching back over three decades of civil war. Several Tamils remarked, that ‘they 
just don’t want to let us live in peace’. Indeed, reports of sexual harassment by 
soldiers in the north-east, particularly in the vicinity of military camps were 
commonplace and long-standing, so that the grease devils were self-evidently 
assumed to be soldiers. 
 
Several Muslim respondents from the East described the grease devil attacks as a 
deliberate ploy by the government to provoke anger, and thus to flush out hidden 
weapons.  As one man, a student at the Eastern University elaborated:  
 
The government suspected Muslim people to have armed groups and guns 
and they wanted to check.  When people are very agitated they will use 
whatever weapons they have to fight back, no? … After the Kinniya incident 
they searched all the houses for guns. When they realised there were no guns, 
they stopped it [the grease devil attacks]. 
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There were also more ambitious and demanding explanations of the type described 
at the beginning of this paper, and of which there were many versions: that the 
grease devils were a special black-ops army unit technically equipped with springs 
on their feet, and claws, nozzles and tubes on their arms to collect the blood of 
virgins, lactating mothers, and those who abstained from pork.  According to some 
versions, this was needed in order to perform a black magic ritual to ward off bad 
luck for the president, (who had also ordered a search in tandem for the crown and 
sword of the ancient Sinhalese king Dutugemunu under the tanks of the Rajarata 
region).  Elsewhere it was to concont a special Chinese medicine to cure the 
president of a terminal affliction.  This particular genre of explanation had many 
subscribers in the Tamils and Muslims of the north-east, but also circulated widely 
among many Sinhalese, and in the country at large.2   
 
Finally, in place of the more top-down, organised, and grander theories at play, the 
grease devils were also explained in terms of a number of far more parochial actors 
and trivial agendas.  For example, in response to reports that twenty grease devils 
had entered the women’s hostel of the South Eastern University in Oluvil on 11 
August, Professor F.M. Ashroff of the university dismissed this as a false rumour, 
spread presumably by students, designed to postpone examinations (VK 12.8.11). 
Similarly, a Muslim shop-keeper in Batticaloa opined that ‘Army may nor may not be 
involved, but many are just perverts from the locality who want to molest women’. 
 
2. Government, and security forces: Police and security forces:  The Sri Lankan 
government and security forces remained largely on the defensive in this period in 
the face of an avalanche of accusations, particularly from the north-east, that they 
were either failing to act, or that they were actually behind the attacks.  Their 
response for the most part, apart from denying the existence of any grease devils, 
was to stress their innocence, and to ridicule the absurdity of the accusations 
against them.  As Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa argued, ‘The President 
does not need any [blood] rituals, because he has the people’s support. …To 
suggest that they [the military] would carry outs acts such as these is ridiculous’.  He 
went on to mark [in jest] that the grease devil might well be the ghost of dead LTTE 
leader Velupillai Prabakaran (VK, 25.08.2011, LD 24.8.11). 
  
But in the face of intense pressure and scrutiny, government ministers, spokesmen, 
pro-government newspapers, police and military officers often went on to provide a 
range of alternative explanations that centred on criminal gangs, foreign forces, 
LTTE revivalists, Tamil political parties, the JVP, and promiscuous women.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  www.lankaenews	  12.08.11.	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At the height of the crisis, Deputy Commissioner of Police Pujitha Jayasundara 
explained to an audience of concerned notables in Batticaloa that the rumours were 
circulated by thieves and people carrying out illegal activities (VK 17.8.11). Former 
police spokesman I.M.Karunaratne blamed drug traffickers, illegal cow smugglers, 
and illicit liquor dealers. Minister Dulles Alahapperuma blamed illegal gem miners 
and loggers. Several military spokesmen argued that the turmoil was motivated by 
those seeking the removal of army and navy camps from the north-east in order to 
pursue their criminality with greater ease (VK 16.8.11). Major General Boniface 
Perera argued that the protests in Kinniya that he had endured were instigated by 
drug traffickers and fishermen using illegal methods such as dynamite, who would 
benefit from a removal of the navy camp (SL 21.8.11). 
 
The search for the identity of the grease devils became embroiled within domestic 
partisan politics, with both the government and opposition parties articulating 
reasons why each other had organised and benefited from it.  An article in the pro-
government Sinhala newspaper Divaina described the turmoil as the handiwork of 
an unnamed Tamil political party who wished to depict the Sri Lankan armed forces 
as molesters and rapists to the international community (DV 21.8.11). Blame was 
also occasionally placed on the pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora (ST 21.8.11), ‘dormant 
LTTE aggravators’ (SL 21.8.11) and unspecified ‘terrorists’ for instigating attacks on 
the security forces.  
 
State media and several police spokesmen charged that the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP), an opposition party with a history of underground violence in the 
1970s and 1980s (Venugopal 2010), was behind the grease devil episode in a bid to 
embarrass the government (DN 15.8.11, DM, 17.8.11, LB 23.8.11).  The JVP for their 
part, retorted that it was the government who had organised it to cover up their 
failures (Lankaviews.com 15.8.11), while the main parliamentary opposition, the 
United National Party (UNP) alleged that the government was promoting disorder in 
the country in order to justify the continuation of a state of emergency (DM 
23.8.11). 
 
Foreign forces:  On the government side, there were a vaguely articulated set of 
accusations that targeted foreign countries.  The military commander of Jaffna, 
Major General Mahinda Hathurusinghe argued that ‘it was an effort by foreign 
forces to disturb the peoples’ peace. These forces give money to people to carry 
out these acts’ (VK 7.9.11). An editorial in Divaina argued that the grease devils 
were part of a larger plot to reignite bloodshed in Sri Lanka, linking it to the then 
ongoing western bombing of Libya (DV 24.8.11).  President Mahinda Rajapaksa 
himself also speculated in a press conference as to whether there was an ulterior 
motive to the grease devils, and perhaps a conspiracy similar to what was 
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happening [with western intervention] in Libya and other Middle Eastern countries 
(VK 29.8.11). 
 
Adulterous women: Finally, a far simpler and more localised rationale for the grease 
devil rumours from the government side placed the blame on the promiscuity of the 
women who made the accusations.  One senior army officer explained to a reporter 
that the women who claimed to have been attacked were ‘either divorced, widows, 
or prostitutes’ (SL 21.8.11). The director of Media Centre for National Security 
(MCNS) Lakshman Hulugalle argued that the grease devil rumours began when an 
adulterous woman lied to her husband to cover up the truth about her ‘paramour’.  
Instead, he held, ‘the medical reports proved that she had a clandestine affair with 
some one elsewhere which she admitted to the Police later’ (DN 23.8.11). 
 
In summary, the interpretation of the grease devil crisis presents itself as a problem 
of increasing complexity.  Not only is it difficult to plainly establish whether it 
happened or not, but the traditional approach that social science adopts in such 
circumstances – of seeking to tear away the mask of mysticism and irrationality to 
uncover a deeper, logically satisfying core – is itself of little help, as the public realm 
was already replete with rationalist unmaskers of the grease devils.  Whereas the 
classic interpretion (Evans-Pritchard 1937) holds that witchcraft accusations (and by 
extension, the recourse to the supernatural in general) should be seen as a way to 
explain inexplicable acts of mundane misfortune, we have here in this case, the 
converse.  Whereas the normal sequence would be for the real world (inexplicable 
tragedies) to be explained by invoking the magical, here we have the magical world 
(grease devils) explained widely in terms of real world instrumentalities, be it sexual 
predation, exam angst, ethnic hostility, criminal intent, western neo-colonialism, or 
adultery. 
 
Under such circumstances, there are grounds to turn the spotlight of scrutiny 
around as it were, and question this very act of identifying and affixing blame and 
instrumentality.  This impulsive search for a deeper, sordid, narrow, economic, 
political or sexual purpose - whether for something as complex as the deployment 
of military personnel to collect the blood of vegetarian virgins, or as trivial as the 
students seeking to postpone an exam – cannot be the end-point of any 
explanation of the grease devils, for it is itself a phenomenon in need of greater 
reflection and explanation – albeit one that is sadly beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
5. What does it Reveal? 
If it is impossible to ascertain whether the grease devils were real or not, or even 
who the culprits were, what then, beyond the immediately self-evident, can be said 
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about these mysterious and violent events?  Rather than looking deeper within the 
crisis to try to understand its truth or the identity of its instigators, can it instead be 
more fruitful to look beyond it to understand what it might be a metaphor for, or 
symptomatic of?  Can this moment of temporary breakdown and collapse provide, 
as Zygmunt Bauman describes of the holocaust literature, a window that allows a 
glimpse into the pathologies of normal everyday existence otherwise hidden from 
view (Bauman 1989)? This section examines three ways (that are overlapping rather 
than exclusive) of going beyond the micro-evidence of the attacks, and of distilling 
out a larger meaning from the crisis. 
 
Unhealed trauma relived:  The most ready interpretation at hand of the grease devil 
crisis is that it reflects accumulated stress and unhealed psychological trauma, and 
that it should be seen as some form of cathartic collective response by a society 
deeply scarred by fear and violence.  This diagnosis connects broadly with Freud 
and also speaks closely to the literature on mass hysteria (or epidemic hysteria, or 
mass sociogenic / psychogenic illness) in psychology and medical anthropology.  In 
case studies ranging from demonic possession in Sri Lanka (Obeyesekere 1970), to 
dancing plagues in medieval European convents, laughing epidemics in East African 
school children (Bartholomew and Sirois 1996, Bartholomew and Wessely 2002) and 
spirit possession in Malaysian garment workers in the 1990s (Ong 1998), the 
underlying problem is identified as some form of pent-up psycho-social stress. John 
Waller’s historical account of mass hysteria in medieval convents describes how:  
 
the dancing plagues and the experiences of demonic nuns still have 
something to tell us about human responses to stress. For these events place 
in bold relief the extraordinary power of context to shape how anguish and 
fear are expressed. (Waller 2009)   
 
In many instances, mass hysteria or demonic possession occur in the context of 
rapid socio-economic changes or oppressive forms of discipline and control 
(Wessely 1987). There is also an emerging body of literature to support the idea 
that violence-affected communities experience greater instances of demonic 
sightings and possession (Nakalawa et al 2010). For example, a study on spirit 
possession among former child soldiers in northern Uganda finds that psychological 
damage from violence is frequently explained in terms of ‘transcendent 
phenomena’ (Neuer et al 2012).   Similarly, the ninja scare in Timor Leste mirrors the 
grease devils in many respects, and similarly affected a people deeply brutalised by 
violence (Martin 2010, Myrttinen 2010). 
 
Indeed, the people of the north-east lived with very high levels of fear and anxiety 
for decades, with the normal rhythms of daily life, (and of entire life-spans) unfolding 
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amidst a regular drumbeat of political murders, disappearances, bomb blasts, and 
bus massacres, as well as everyday incidents of violence short of death, including 
torture, intimidation, extortion, and the abduction of children.  Many of these 
shadowy deaths and disappearances during the war years were never accounted 
for, but were instead superseded by the constant stream of other fresher atrocities.  
There has as a result, been little accounting, much less accountability, for the 
massive loss of life. 
 
This interpretation of the grease devil crisis as an outcome of unresolved collective 
trauma, and as a lens into the brutalised psyche of the north-eastern Tamils is 
appealing at many levels.  It is well supported by the available psycho-social 
evidence (Somasundaram 2003), and also by two compelling ethnographies of the 
role of oracles and traditional healing rituals amongst Tamils in the north-east 
(Lawrence 2000, Derges 2012).    
 
Structural violence enacted:  A second and related way of interpreting the crisis is as 
a metaphor for latent forms of ‘structural’ violence in society, so that the improbable 
reports of grease devil attacks are in essence, coded re-enactments of something 
deeper.  As with spirit possession, issues that cannot normally be spoken of for 
reasons of propriety, are brought out into the public realm under extraordinary 
circumstances and in a highly charged manner.  The grease devil attacks become a 
way in which violence and oppression, discussion of which is suppressed, find an 
outlet through the anguished narration of an attack by a mysterious, powerful, male 
stranger.  As Bartholomew and Sirois (1996: 292) describe, mass hysteria episodes 
are endemic among females in schools and factories facing ‘repressive, intolerable 
social situations … While female redress is culturally unacceptable in these 
societies, males typically believe that those affected are possessed by spirits’.   
 
There are two operative dimensions to note here that overlap, but are otherwise 
distinct: gender and ethnicity.  On the one hand, the grease devil attack is a 
narrative of sexual violence, and is indicative of the extent to which women (of all 
ethnicities around the island), particularly in small towns and villages of the 
periphery are vulnerable to predatory male aggression.  In this interpretation, the 
colourful descriptions of this lithe, lecherous spiderman are not to be dismissed as 
the paranoid fantasies of shrinking violets and sheltered village damsels (or even as 
the alibis spun by adulterous wives and promiscuous widows), but provide vivid 
insights of the pervasive, unpredictable, sexual aggression that women routinely 
face.  
 
War and militarisation are very important elements of this gendered interpretation, 
as it has resulted in the transfer of tens of thousands of young males into the north-
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east, and has in parallel depleted many Sinhalese areas outside the north-east of 
their men, rendering women more vulnerable in both parts.  Indeed, the men who 
were eventually arrested by the police for the Kahawatte murders (all of whom were 
Sinhalese women) in July 2011 were described in the media as army deserters. 
 
A second dimension of latent violence is along lines of ethnicity, and signifies the 
contentious confrontation between the Sinhala-dominated state and the minorities.  
While women around the island of all ethnicities reported grease devil attacks and 
anxiety, it assumed the dimensions of a crisis only where minorities were 
predominant. The image of the muscular and predatory grease devil in this 
interpretation corresponds to the army soldier, roaming, occupying, and 
aggressively encroaching on the physical and social terrain of the north-east.  
 
In this post-war dystopia, the LTTE as a putative alternative provider of security and 
protector of Tamils no longer exists, such that they are left at the complete mercy of 
the vast Sinhala-dominated state security forces. The grease devil thus signifies the 
totalising encroachment of the military in the north-east into the public, material 
sphere, and even beyond, into the more private and intimate sphere of the Tamil 
and Muslim home, which as Partha Chatterjee would describe, is the domain of 
nation’s uncolonised, spiritual, female core (Chatterjee 1993).  
 
There is an important insight that Nancy Scheper-Hughes provides in her analysis of 
the body parts theft rumours in South America during the 1990s: these rumours and 
the widespread hysteria they generated, occurred in the aftermath of a period of 
authoritarian violence in the region.  By that time, public enquiries and truth 
commission reports had publicly exposed the macabre mechanics of 
disappearances, illegal adoptions, and the extraction of body parts for transplants 
from the bodies of dead dissidents and criminals.  She describes how ‘The rumours 
have appeared, then, during a time when ordinary people finally became aware of 
the magnitude of the atrocities practised by the state’ (Scheper-Hughes 1996). 
 
In much the same way, the grease devil rumours emerged in the aftermath of the Sri 
Lanka war and more than two years after its extraordinarily brutal conclusion in May 
2009 (Weiss 2011).  The specific rumours that circulated, and the grease devil 
encounters described may well turn out to lack substance.  Nevertheless, the crisis 
erupted at a time (and this is particularly with reference to north-eastern Tamils 
rather than Muslims or up-country Tamils) when the enormity of the civilian death 
toll in 2009 became apparent in the public domain and had become lodged in the 
(Tamil) public consciousness.   
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What is common to both the gender and ethnic variants of the structural violence 
interpretation is that they imply the aggression and one-sided violence of males and 
soldiers, and the passivity of their victims: women and minorities.  Though 
speculative and interpretive, and based on creative inference rather than verifiable 
data, there is much that is convincing and intellectually satisfying about this 
interpretation.  It does not however, account for the counter-reaction that ensued.  
What made it a crisis as such was not the depth of anxiety, or the frequency and 
ferocity of the reported violence (which occurred throughout the country), but the 
breakdown in the state’s authority that it precipitated in the non-Sinhala areas.  The 
crisis was marked not just by one-sided attacks on cowed victims, but by the 
extraordinary fury with which the affected communities responded and took on the 
state. 
 
Hegemony undone: There is thus a third interpretation of the grease devil crisis: 
that it demonstrated not the power or aggression of the state in controlling the 
minorities, but its weakness.  As Scheper-Hughes describes (of the body parts theft 
rumours), this is ‘a classic “weapon of the weak.” The rumors have shown their 
ability to challenge and interrupt the designs of medicine and the state’ (Scheper 
Hughes 2000).  
 
The state either lost or had diminished control of parts of the north-east Sri Lanka 
for several days.  What made it a crisis was not just that people were afraid, but 
because there was a breakdown in the sphere of governance and administration.  
Angry crowds all across the north-east confronted, accosted, and even attacked the 
police and army.  In Puttalam, a policeman was killed by a furious mob.  The 
statements and actions of the police and security forces in this period were not 
those of a confident, victorious oppressor at rest.  Rather, they indicated an 
executive that was desperate, perplexed, and even paralysed, having been 
suddenly confronted with the reality that their ability to control an agitated and 
uncooperative population was limited.  
 
What I suggest is that this indicates a much broader breakdown in the implicit 
contract that governs state-minority relations.  Drawing on the conceptualisation of 
‘hegemonic control’ in ‘ethnic democracies’ from Northern Ireland, Israel and India 
(O’Leary and McGarry 1995, Smooha 2002, Singh 2010), Sri Lanka can similarly be 
understood as a case where juridically enshrined rights to equal citizenship on an 
individual basis are layered onto and rest upon what are perhaps a more important 
set of unwritten rules that stratify state-society relations based on collective identity.   
 
In Sri Lanka, the sectarian ideology of the majority community (Sinhala nationalism) 
is closely incorporated into the legitimacy and practices of the state, such that it 
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constitutes the register of political morality that regulates state-society relations 
(Venugopal 2008).  This close identification of the state with one dominant 
community creates self-evident problems in the constitution of legitimacy and the 
exercise of power over non-Sinhalese minority groups.  In practice, this is addressed 
through an implicit bargain where minorities seek to limit their vulnerability and 
insecurity by accepting subordinate status within a dependable and regulated 
ethnic hierarchy.  Through a combination of elite cooption and mass cooperation, 
minorities are thus drawn in, and become complicit in a process designed to control 
them, and through which their nominally equal citizenship rights at the individual 
level are undermined by manifestly inferior collective claims on, and access to, an 
ethnically segmented state.  
 
In post-war north-eastern Sri Lanka, the pervasive presence and influence of the 
military lends the impression that ‘order’ is maintained largely by coercion. 
However, coercion is in reality rarely explicit, as it is expensive, and can have 
unpredictable consequences.  Instead, following Gramsci very loosely, the idea of 
hegemonic control suggests that that the exercise of power requires some 
ideological persuasion to win consent and cooperation.  There are elements here 
which are debatable: for example, whether this collective exercise of cooperation is 
based more on pragmatism and the imperatives of collective self-preservation 
rather than the docile ‘consent’ wrought by the acceptance of a ruling ideology.  
But regardless, neither cooperation nor consent are unconditional.  They rest on an 
implicit expectation of reciprocity from the state, and contain unwritten moral red 
lines, which if crossed, precipitate a breakdown and crisis in minority-state relations.   
 
This crucial element of the Sri Lankan state’s exercise of power in the north-east is 
internalised so widely, that it is not apparent even to the individuals who are 
involved in performing it on both sides.  It is only in the rare instances, such as the 
grease devil crisis, that its role becomes apparent: when legitimacy turns into 
illegitimacy, cooperation turns into confrontation, and the consent to rule 
evaporates. Under such circumstances in mid-2011, the state became incapacitated 
and its power was, however briefly, rendered ephemeral.  
 
For the first time in several decades, the grease devil triggered a series of 
spontaneous popular demonstrations in the Tamil areas of Batticaloa and Jaffna 
(spontaneous in the sense that it was not directly instigated or coerced into being 
by an armed militant group), where people did the unthinkable in openly 
confronting the military in an aggressive and provocative manner. As sequitur to 
Jonathan Spencer’s account of the ‘moment that the political died in northern Sri 
Lanka’ (Spencer 2008), when violence overtook politics in 1983, this display of 
uncoerced popular political action may have been a moment when the political 
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sprang back to life.  It occurred at a time when people felt that the state had 
crossed all bounds of acceptable behaviour, and had launched an intolerable attack 
on them. 
 
I will conclude with a note of caution – that it is important to not overstate the case.  
This was a fleeting instant of resistance through the withdrawal of consent, not a 
revolution.  It served, however briefly, to render bare the ontology of power, but in 
a way that did not obviously suggest how a challenge to it could be generated or 
sustained.  Furthermore, following the line of argument pursued above, the 
identification of weapons of the weak and latent forms of resistance to an 
oppressive militarised regime does not imply that there was a conscious 
functionality at work: Tamils and Muslims did not invent the grease devils and wind 
themselves up into a frenzy of anger in order to create chaos in the north-east.  As 
Foucalt notes: 
 
There is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. 
But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an 
individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its 
rationality (Foucault 1978:95) 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has sought to reconstruct and understand the events of Sri Lanka’s 
grease devil crisis of 2011.  Drawing on the available evidence at hand, it has 
explored three different approaches that seek to explain and attach meaning to the 
crisis.   
 
The first such approach of parsing the evidence to understand what happened 
corresponds to an understanding of the grease devil as a self-contained 
phenomenon amenable to causal explanations. The second approach goes one 
step further, to situate the phenomenon beyond itself, as a constituent instrumental 
or functional element within some larger rationale or system.  In effect, this 
approach downgrades the grease devil from a dependent variable that is to be 
explained in its own right, to an independent variable that forms only a part of some 
other explanation.   
 
Both of these approaches resulted in explanations that were either inconclusive, 
unverifiable, or trivial.  Furthermore, the possibility of drawing analytical insights 
from instrumental or functional explanations became seriously compromised by the 
way in which such explanations – in the form of rumours and conspiracy theories – 
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proliferated in that context, and were in themselves an important part of the 
anatomy of the crisis. 
 
The third approach goes even one step further to situate the grease devil entirely 
outside the primary frame of analysis, either as the object of explanation or as 
explanatory factor.  Instead, it is an event that is relevant insofar as it briefly serves 
to illuminate and delineate the features of some other larger phenomenon: in this 
case, unhealed trauma, structural violence, or contested hegemony.  All three are 
plausible, and they provide the grease devil crisis with a greater degree of meaning, 
context, and analytical richness than the earlier two approaches.   
 
They are however, ultimately based on reasoned speculation, rather than hard 
evidence, so that the preference for any one over the other will depend on the taste 
and predisposition of the reader.  It should be obvious from the last part of the 
paper that while I have sympathy with all three, my own preference is for the third 
interpretation, and that I view this to be a case where a fleeting, unanticipated 
moment of crisis provided a glimpse into the way that state power operates, and 
how state-minority relations are ordered. 
 
Finally, there are important implications that this argument has for Sinhala 
nationalism. In recent work, Rampton (2011) and Venugopal (2008) have argued 
against the idea of elite instrumentalism, and suggest that Sinhala nationalism poses 
limits to the exercise of power by state elites.  In other words, hegemony sprang not 
from above, but from below, through the iron-clad grip that Sinhala nationalism 
held on popular conceptions of political morality: that is, on what constitutes the 
legitimate role of the state, and what the state ought to do.  Whereas aspiring 
political elites often toyed with and pandered to Sinhala nationalism (the so-called 
‘ethnic outbidding’) in order to claw their way into power, they were, until Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, pusillanimous about it once they actually assumed power.   
 
The success of the Rajapaksas is that they have continued to embrace Sinhala 
nationalism well after the election campaign, and have as such, tamed the turbulent 
sea of hegemony to gain an unassailable command of the political realm.  However, 
as the grease devil crisis demonstrated, the task of accessing this hegemonic 
control and winning the consent of the ruled in the Sinhala south can well mean 
disturbing it in grave and entirely unpredictable ways in the non-Sinhala areas of the 
north, east, and centre. 
 
 
 
 
Venugopal	  -­‐	  Violence	  and	  Moral	  Panic	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  
	  
25	  
	  
NEWSPAPERS 
 
Virakesari (Tamil) - VK 
Divaina (Sinhala) - DV 
Lankadeepa (Sinhala) - LD 
Lakbima (Sinhala) - LB 
Sunday Times (English) - ST 
Sunday Leader (English) – SL 
Sunday Observer (English) - SO 
Daily Mirror (English) - DM 
Daily News (English) - DN 
Tamilnet (English) - TN  
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